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Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through 
it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession. 
Many are plainly harmless; some appear ominously 
harmful. Some, for all the benign appearance of their 
spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of followers that 
deplete trials of fairness .... So an inquiry into what makes 
an error harmless, though one of philosophical tenor, is also 
an intensely practical inquiry into the health and sanitation 
of the law. 
Roger J. Traynor! 
I.lNTRODUCTION 
The concept of harmless error and its mirror image, harmful 
error, generally are given short shrift in law school. Despite the 
pragmatic importance of the subject, most law school professors 
and casebooks devote to it little, if any, time,2 other than to briefly 
inform students that harmless error will not be grounds for 
appellate reversal and that harmful error is error that affects the 
"substantial rights" of the parties.3 The reasons for this intellectual 
1. ROGERJ. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLEss ERROR at ix (1970). 
2. See, e.g., JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, CASES & MATERIAlS ON 
EVIDENCE 52- 60 (8th ed. 1995) (discussing FRE 103(a) with no discussion on the 
harmless error rule). 
3. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected. "); FED. R. CIv. P. 61 ("No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial 
or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing 
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties."); 28 U.S.C. § 2111 ("On the hearing of any 
appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an 
examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect 
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silence are varied. First, the law school courses most likely to 
address the topic-civil procedure and evidence-are overflowing 
with numerous conceptually challenging topics, leaving little 
pedagogical time for meaningful discussion of something as 
seemingly arcane as harmless error. Second, the law of harmless 
error itself is much more complex than it initially appears, making 
accurate and thorough instruction on the subject difficult, even 
assuming the time was available. The resulting intellectual void is 
both pervasive and perverse. Very few lawyers-and hence, 
judges-know much about harmless error, and their ignorance fuels 
perversities such as poor legal argument, unfocused reasoning, and 
seemingly inconsistent judicial decisions. In an attempt to fill the 
current intellectual void, this article explicates a broad-ranging, 
coherent synthesis of the law of harmless error in Michigan. 
II. WHAT IS HARMLEss ERROR? 
Harmless error rules are, essentially, proxies for the level of 
assurance that an appellate court must have before it is permitted to 
set aside the judgment below. How a jurisdiction dermes harmless 
error will thus reveal a good deal about how comfortable (or 
uncomfortable) policymakers in the jurisdiction feel about trial 
error, and correspondingly, how severe such error must be before 
it will result in appellate reversal. Harmless error analysis is thus 
perhaps best viewed as a quest to determine whether the trial 
resulted in a judgment that is manifestly just; if the judgment is 
deemed just, the error is deemed harmless, and the judgment will 
stand. In a very real sense, therefore, the standard for harmless error 
that is adopted will reflect a policy decision as to what constitutes 
"justice" at the trial level. 
Attempting to define "justice" is, of course, a highly subjective 
task, since the term means different things to different people and 
varies further according to the facts. If we assume, therefore, that 
harmless error jurisprudence is designed to further trial court 
the substantial rights of the parties. "). 
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"justice II (and hence to overturn only those judgments that are 
"unjust"), we must necessarily ask ourselves what we mean when 
we use the word "justice." Is our quest for justice, for example, 
limited to making sure that the right result was reached at the trial 
level? Or is justice about something more- such as ensuring that 
the trial was conducted in a fair manner? Does, in other words, the 
appearance of justice have value, even if the result reached at the trial 
level is most likely correct? 
At early common law, getting the "right result" seemed almost 
irrelevant, and the appearance of justice reigned supreme. The 
"Exchequer Rule ll of the early English courts- subsequently 
embraced by American courts-presumed that all trial errors were 
harmful, thus requiring a new trial.4 In this atmosphere, reversals 
for relatively minor trial errors were commonplace. For example, 
in 1880, the California Supreme Court, in People v. St. Clair,S 
reversed a conviction for larceny because the indictment charged 
the defendant with entry into a building "with intent to commit 
larcey. "6 The court reasoned that because there was no such crime 
as "larcey," the indictment was fatally flawed, failing to charge the 
defendant with a specific criminal offense.7 Likewise, in 
Commonwealth v. Carney,8 the defendant was indicted for 
assaulting and beating James Hartman.9 The Supreme Court of 
Virginia quashed the indictment because it failed to specify that the 
offense had been committed "against the peace and dignity of the 
Commonwealth."lo The Wisconsin Supreme Court took a similar 
4. See WA YNER. LAP A VE&JEROLDH.IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 995 
(1985). 
5. 56 Cal. 406 (1880). 
6. Id. at 407. 
7. See id. ("[T]his is more than a departure from an established form; ..• it 
is a failure to describe an offense. "). 
8. 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 546 (1847). 
9. Seeid. 
10. Id. at 547. See also Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402 (1871) (reversing 
conviction for failure of indictment, which merely specified that offense was 
committed "against the peace of and dignity of the state"). 
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view in Williams v. State,l1 reversing a conviction against a 
defendant indicted for an offense committed "against the peace of 
the State of Wisconsin. "12 The indictment's seemingly trivial failure 
to specify that the offense was "against the peace and dignity of the 
State" proved fatalY Even as recently as 1945, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals set aside a murder conviction due to a 
maddeningly technical error. In Gragg v. State,14 the defendant's 
indictment charged him with killing his wife, Flora. Specifically, 
the indictment stated that Gragg had "drowned" his wife. IS The 
error warranting reversal, according to the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals, was the failure of the indictment to allege the 
"means" by which the drowning was accomplished, other than 
merely water.16 
These early common law cases exemplify an obsession with the 
appearance of justice, perhaps to the exclusion of justice itself. 
Focusing exclusively on the appearance of justice thus gave rise to 
a harmless error jurisprudence intolerant of even the most trivial 
trial court errors, indicating relative disinterest in ensuring that the 
right result was reached. Modem harmless error jurisprudence, on 
the other hand, is largely a reaction to the hyper~technical nature of 
early common law. As with most other areas of the law, the 
concept of harmless error fluctuates over time, much like a 
11. 27 Wis. 402 (1871). 
12.1d. 
13. See id. at 403 (emphasis added). The court based its decision on a 
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution which states that "all indictments shall 
conclude against the peace and dignity of the state." ld. It thus concluded that it 
had no authority to disregard what it viewed as a mandatory constitutional 
requirement. See id. 
14. 186 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945). 
15. See id. at 247. 
16. See id. Specifically, the court concluded that "there should be an 
averment of some overt act of the accused which brought about the drowning 
of his wife, if such act is known. To illustrate, that he pushed her from the bank 
into the water, or that he pushed her out of a boat into the water, or held her 
head under the water." ld. 
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pendulum swinging back and forth in reaction to the social and 
political forces around it. Thus, the harshness of early common law 
harmless error jurisprudence, with its emphatic emphasis on 
technicality over substance, marked one extreme of the pendulum 
swing. Ineluctably, perhaps, the pendulum is now swinging back, 
away from technicality, towards an emphasis on ensuring that trials 
reach the "right result." H the trial result appears substantively 
correct (i.e., in accordance with the evidence), the modem trend in 
Michigan is to let the trial judgment stand, even if the trial court 
committed errors-even constitutional errors-along the way. 
ill. MICIDGAN STANDARDS OF HARMLESS ERROR 
Modem harmless error analysis in Michigan involves 
consideration of four statutory and rule-based standards: (1) the 
criminal harmless error statute;17 (2) the civil procedure rule;18 (3) 
the rule of evidence;19 and (4) the plain error doctrine.2o Although 
there is great similarity in the language employed by each of these 
harmless error standards, the case law interpreting these rules and 
statutes varies widely. 
In the criminal context, the applicable harmless error statute, 
section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,21 states that "[n]o 
judgment or verdict shall be set aside ... in any criminal case ... 
unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the 
entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of 
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Ifl1 In the civil context, the 
applicable rule of procedure states that "[a]n error ... is not ground 
for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for . . . 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this 
17. See MICH. COMPo LAWS § 769.26 (1979). 
18. See MICH. CT. R. 2.613. 
19. See MICH. R. EVID. 103(a). 
20. See MICH. R. EVID. 103(d}. 
21. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 769.26 (1979). 
22.Id (emphasis added). 
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action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. tfl3 
For errors predicated on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the 
applicable rule states that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right 
of the party is affected, and [a timely objection or offer of proof has 
been made.]"24 Finally, the plain error doctrine states that 
"[n]othing in this rule [of evidence] precludes taking notice of plain 
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court. "25 
Looking at the language of these four harmless error standards, 
a salient question arises: Is there any difference among them? Is 
there, in other words, a substantive distinction to be drawn 
between error which results in a "miscarriage of justice" (criminal 
statute) versus error that is "inconsistent with substantial justice" 
(civil procedure rule) versus error which affects a "substantial right" 
(evidentiary rulings)? All four standards appear to hinge upon the 
word "justice," which, as has already been pointed out, is a highly 
subjective term. But is an error which results in a "miscarriage of 
justice" (criminal statute) a qualitatively different beast than an 
error which is "inconsistent with substantial justice" (civil 
procedure rule)? Would all miscarriages of justice, in other words, 
necessarily be inconsistent with substantial justice? Or is the 
addition of the word "substantial" in the civil procedure rule 
intended to place greater limitations on reversals for harmful error 
in civil trials? Moreover, is an error which affects a "substantial 
right" (rule of evidence) somehow different in kind from an error 
which miscarries or substantially affects justice? Could, in other 
words, an error affect a substantial right of the parties and yet have 
no effect on "justice"? 
These kinds of questions naturally arise in the mind of a welI-
trained lawyer who reads the four Michigan harmless error 
standards. One finds oneself wondering: Why have four standards? 
And moreover, why have four standards which use similar, but not 
23. MICH. CT. R. 2.613 (emphasis added). 
24. MICH. R. EVID. 103(a) (emphasis added). 
25. MICH. R. EVID. 103(d) (emphasis added). 
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identical, language? Undertaking research with the hope of 
uncovering a logical explanation for the differing language is in 
vain. There does not appear to be any conscious effort by the 
drafters of any of these four standards to harmonize the standards 
with the other standards, nor to explain why different language was 
chosen. Michigan lawyers and judges, therefore, are left to struggle 
over these diaphanous words with virtually no guidance as to their 
meaning-and struggle they have. 
IV. UNPRESERVED ERROR 
Any explanation of harmless error should begin with an 
explanation of its legal cousin, plain error. The Michigan Rule of 
Evidence dealing with plain error does not attempt to define the 
term; rather, it merely states that "[n]othing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they 
were not brought to the attention of the court."26 From this 
language, it is evident that four requisites exist for plain error: (1) 
there must have been an error committed by the trial court; (2) the 
error must be "plain"; (3) the error must affect a "substantial right"; 
and (4) the error was not brought to the attention of the court (i.e., 
it was not preserved by an appropriate objection or offer of proof). 
Assuming that an error has been committed, and that the error was 
not properly preserved, the salient questions therefore become: (1) 
what do we mean by "plain"?; and (2) what do we mean when we 
say that the error must affect a "substantial right"? 
In People v. Grant,27 the Michigan Supreme Court cited with 
approval the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of "plain" error from 
United States v. Oiano,28 which concluded that "plain" error was 
"synonymous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious error. , "29 The 
Grant court also concluded that an unpreserved error affects a 
"substantial right" if the error "could have been decisive of the 
26.Id 
27. 520 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 1994). 
28.507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
29.Id at 734. 
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outcome or ... [if the error] falls under the category of cases, yet to 
be clearly defined, where prejudice is presumed or reversal is 
automatic. "30 
Plain error thus emerges from Grant as an obvious error-plain 
for the world to see, even without a proper objection or offer of 
proof being made-that is potentially outcome decisive or 
presumptively prejudicial. Harmful error that is not properly 
preserved by the party will therefore be grounds for appellate 
reversal only if the error was so plain that proper preservation is 
not needed to facilitate appellate review, and the error is so 
prejudicial that it is likely outcome determinative. The focus in the 
context of plain error therefore appears to be with making sure the 
right result is reached (outcome determination), not a broader 
concern about preserving the appearance of justice.31 
This narrower conception of harmful error is likely warranted 
by a couple of factors present in the plain error context that are not 
present in other harmful error contexts. First, because plain error 
is, by definition, error which has not been properly preserved by 
the party claiming error, the harmed party has, to a certain extent, 
"dirty hands"-a degree of culpability not normally present with 
other types of harmful error. The trial error, in other words, is 
partially the fault of the party claiming error because that party 
failed to voice an objection or make an offer of proof that would 
have allowed the trial court to make a proper ruling. Because the 
party claiming error thus shares culpability for the error, the plain 
30. Grant, 520 N.W.2d at 131. 
31. Indeed, the Grant court cited with approval Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
statement in United States 7). Mechanik that 
The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces 
jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend 
further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has 
already once taken place .... Thus, while reversal "may, in theory, 
entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the 
accused with complete freedom from prosecution," and thereby "cost 
society the right to punish admitted offenders ... 
Id. at 130 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986) (citations 
omitted). 
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error doctrine is designed to minimize appellate reversal in his 
favor to those situations where the error was likely outcome 
determinative. Second, because the error has not been properly 
preserved (through an objection or offer of prool), the appellate 
court will not have any record upon which to base its review. 
Rather, the appellate court necessarily has to rely upon the 
"obviousness" of the error and attempt to divine, as best it can, 
whether and to what extent the error may have affected the trier of 
fact. The lack of a record thus impedes the appellate court's ability 
to conduct an appropriate review, which, in turn, creates a 
hesitation to reverse in such situations absent a conviction by the 
appellate court that the error likely affected the outcome. Because 
of the inherent difficulty in reviewing an error that was not 
preserved below-and the fact that the difficulty was caused, in part, 
by the party raising the error on appeal-the standard for plain 
error is a parsimonious one focused on outcome determination. 
The culpability of the party claiming error also helps predict and 
explain who bears the burden of proving the elements of plain error 
on appeal. The Grant court adopted the position of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Olano,32 which made it clear that 
the party complaining of an unpreserved error bears the burden of 
proving that the error was both plain and potentially outcome 
determinative.33 
Although the elements and burden of proof in plain error are 
relatively clear, the application of those elements and carrying the 
burden is not. Whether an unpreserved error is sufficiently 
"obvious" to warrant appellate review and whether it potentially 
affected the outcome are inherently complex questions upon which 
reasonable minds can, and often do, differ. Generalizations are 
difficult, other than perhaps to state that a court is more likely to 
find plain error in a criminal case (particularly involving an error 
affecting the accused's constitutional rights) than a civil case, and 
even then it is a relatively rare occurrence.34 As with the rest of 
32. 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
33. See Grant, 520 N. W.2d at 131; Oiano, 507 U.S. at 741. 
34. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 211-212 (4th ed. 1992). 
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harmless error jurisprudence, plain error analysis is heavily fact-
dependent and difficult to defme or predict. "In the end, precision 
seems beyond reach. Verbal formulae do little to help distinguish 
between ordinary and plain error in degree of seriousness or 
obviousness, nor to explain when errors adversely affect the 
integrity of the system . . . . Decisions finding plain error or 
rejecting claims of such error reflect little more than the 
conclusions reached. "35 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR 
An imponant distinction in harmless error jurisprudence is 
made between constitutional and non-constitutional error, each of 
which has its own legal standards and case law. A constitutional 
error is an error which results in the violation of the patty's 
constitutional rights; a non-constitutional error does not. 
Constitutional errors that violate a pany's federal (as opposed to 
state) constitutional rights-as the vast majority of constitutional 
errors do-oblige state courts to look to federal precedents 
explicating harmless error.36 Constitutional errors, moreover, are 
intellectually bifurcated into two categories: (1) structural; and (2) 
non-structural errors. 
A. Structural Constitutional Errors 
Structural constitutional errors have been described by the U.S. 
Supreme Conn as "[a] structural defect 0 in the constitution of the 
trial mechanism, which def1:ies] analysis by 'harmless error' 
standards."37 Fnnhermore, structural errors are "so basic to a fair 
trial" that they "can never be deemed as harmless. "38 As such, the 
u.S. Supreme Conn has made it clear that, given their serious 
35. CHRIsToPHERB. MUELLER &LAIRDC. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 29-30 
(2d ed. 1999). 
36. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967). 
37. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). 
38. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. 
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nature, structural errors are the "exception and not the rule" 
amongst constitutional errors.39 More importantly, once a 
constitutional trial error has been identified as structural, automatic 
reversal of the conviction is required.4O Structural constitutional 
errors are, therefore, of such a serious nature that they will result 
in appellate reversal, regardless of whether the error was preserved 
at the trial level. 
The basic description of structural error- an error that is never 
harmless-is, of course, circular; it essentially begs the question of 
how to identify such per se harmful errors. The Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence regarding structural errors is, therefore, a sort of "we 
know it when we see it" decision making found in other complex 
areas of the law, such as obscenity. But despite the diaphanous 
descriptions of structural error, the Court has provided pragmatic 
guidance by identifying several examples of structural errors, 
including the use of coerced confessions,41 complete deprivation of 
the right to trial counsel,42 the use of a biased or partial judge,43 and 
directing a verdict against the criminal defendant.44 Other examples 
include systematic exclusion of grand jurors who are of the same 
race as the defendant;45 denial of the right of self-representation;46 
denial of the right to a public trial;47 and providing a 
constitutionally improper reasonable doubt jury instruction.48 
B. Non-structural Constitutional Errors 
Not all constitutional errors, however, require automatic 
reversal. Non-structural constitutional errors may be-indeed, often 
39. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986). 
40. See People v. Anderson, 521 N.W.2d 538 (Mich. 1994). 
41. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 577 (citingPaynev. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958». 
42. See id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963». 
43. See id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927». 
44. See id. at 578. 
45. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986). 
46. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984). 
47. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984). 
48. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). 
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are-deemed harmless. Thus, although a party's constitutional 
rights may have been infringed, the categorization of certain 
constitutional errors as non-structural is a statement that such 
errors are not as inherently prejudicial and that "there can be no 
such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and that the Constitution 
does not guarantee such a trial. "~9 
A non-structural-or "trial type" -constitutional error has been 
described as an error that "occurs during the presentation of the 
case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed 
in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine 
whether its admission was harmless. "50 As such, they do not require 
automatic reversal (as do structural errors), but rather are subject to 
a harmless error standard that requires the prosecutor to prove that 
the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "51 
The "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for non-
structural constitutional errors is a demanding one, requiring that 
the party seeking to affirm the trial verdict convince the appellate 
court that the error did not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The presumption, therefore, is that non-structural 
constitutional errors are prejudicial, and the prosecutor bears a 
heavy burden of convincing the appellate court otherwise. Given 
the relative gravity of the error involved, the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard for non-structural constitutional error is thus a 
compromise between the harshness of the automatic reversal rule 
for structural error and the laxity of lesser standards (e.g., "more 
probable than notlt) that would result in a greater number of 
affirmances. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard thus 
indicates that the appearance of justice is important, just not as 
important in the structural error context.52 
49. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983) (citing Brown v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973». 
50. Fu/minante, 499 U.S. at 307-08. 
51. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
52. Accord LAP AVE & IsRAEL, supra note 4, at 1006 (concluding that the 
Chapman "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard "clearly rejected a 'correct 
result' test [for harmless error]."). 
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Most constitutional trial errors are thus non-structural in 
nature, particularly those constitutional errors involving the 
admission or exclusion of evidence, and are therefore not subject to 
automatic reversal. The u.s. Supreme Court has identified 
numerous examples of non-structural errors, including: the 
admission of a statement to a police officer in violation of the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel;53 denial of an 
accused's right to cross-examination;54 comments by the 
prosecution, in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, regarding an accused's failure to testify;55 the 
admission of a statement by one defendant identifying and 
incriminating another (in violation of the Bruton doctrine};56 the 
admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment;57 and the admission of involuntary confessions. 58 
Lower courts have expanded the list of non-structural errors to 
include such things as the admission of hearsay in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause;59 the admission of 
statements obtained in violation of an accused's Fifth Amendment 
Miranda rights;60 and the admission of the post-Miranda silence of 
an accused.61 
One of the most significant Michigan cases involving non-
structural constitutional error is a 1994 decision by the Michigan 
Supreme Court, People v. Anderson.62 In Anderson, the defendant 
was charged with first degree criminal sexual conduct against his 
nine year-old daughter.63 Shortly after the defendant's arrest (and 
53. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972). 
54. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 683-84 (1986). 
55. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-12 (1983). 
56. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973). 
57. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970). 
58. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934,944 (2d Cir. 1991). 
60. See, e.g., Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1022 (2d Cir. 1989). 
61. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
62.521 N.W.2d 538 (Mich. 1994). 
63. See id. at 540. 
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after his Miranda rights had been given), the defendant informed an 
officer that he had had "sexual thoughts about his daughter."6-4 The 
prosecutor at trial attempted to introduce this post-arrest 
inculpatory statement; defense counsel objected to the statement's 
admission on grounds that the statement was obtained in violation 
of the defendant's right to counsel. 65 The trial judge held a mid-trial 
evidentiary hearing, overruled the objection, and admitted the 
statement.66 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
judge's ruling in an unpublished, per curiam decision.67 
The Michigan Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 
defendant's conviction.68 The court agreed that the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights were violated,69 yet the court found that 
this error was non-structural in nature and hence, subject to a 
harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.7° Applying this 
standard to the case at bar, the court characterized the erroneously 
admitted statement as "an inculpatory and highly prejudicial 
admission"71 and reasoned that, given the effect of the statement on 
the defendant's credibility, it could not conclude "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this inadmissible evidence did not tip the 
scale in favor of the prosecution and contribute to the jury's 
verdict. 1172 
C. Constitutional Errors: Direct vs. Habeas Review 
Another important distinction to be drawn in the area of 
constitutional error is the difference between errors complained of 
on direct review versus those complained of on habeas corpus 
64.Id. at 541 (emphasis omitted). 
65. See id. at 542. 
66. See id. at 541. 
67. See id. at 542, n.18. 
68. See id. at 545-46. 
69. See id. at 544. 
70. See id. at 545. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 546. 
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review. The U.S. Supreme Court's five-four decision in Brecht v. 
Abrahamson73 delineates the significance of this distinction. Brecht 
involved an instance of non-structural constitutional 
error-specifically, the prosecutorial use of post-Miranda silence to 
impeach the criminal defendant.74 The Court was specifically asked 
to decide whether the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard75 pronounced in Chapman v. California for non-structural 
constitutional error was the appropriate standard for use in 
reviewing such errors on habeas, as opposed to direct, review. A 
majority of the Court held that the Chapman "harmless beyond 
reasonable doubt" standard is inapplicable on habeas review; the 
proper standard in such cases comes instead from Kotteakos v. 
United States,76 which held that error is harmful if it has a 
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
jury's verdict. "77 Thus, habeas petitioners are not entitled to relief 
based upon trial court errors "unless they can establish that [such 
error(s)] resulted in 'actual prejudice."'78 
The Brecht Court reasoned that the "Kotteakos harmless error 
standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral 
review than the Chapman standard, and application of a less 
onerous harmless-error standard on habeas promotes the 
considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence. "79 Specifically, 
because convictions being reviewed collaterally are "presumptively 
correct," the Court concluded that imposing a heavy burden on the 
prosecution to prove that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt would "undermineD the States' interest in finality 
and infringeD upon their sovereignty over criminal matters. 
73.507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
74. The use of post-Miranda silence of an accused was held to violate the 
Constitution in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Numerous lower courts have 
held Doyle errors to be non-structural in nature. See Gonzalez, 921 F.2d at 1550; 
Leecan v. Lopes, 893 F.2d 1434 (2d Cir. 1990). 
75. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
76.328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
77. Id at 776. 
78. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 
79.Id. at 623. 
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Moreover, granting habeas relief merely because there is a 
'reasonable probability' that trial error contributed to the verdict 
... is at odds with the historic meaning of habeas corpus-to afford 
relief to those whom society has 'grievously wronged."'so 
The language in Brecht thus suggests that the burden of proving 
harmfulness of error on collateral review should not rest with the 
prosecution but with the habeas petitioner. Indeed, three dissenters 
in Brecht1 explicitly noted this intimation, suggesting that the 
majority's holding does, in fact, place the burden of proving a 
IIsubstantial and injurious effectll upon on the habeas petitioner.82 
Justice Stevens, however, did not agree with this portion of the 
majority's ruling, stating in his concurrence that the Kotteakos 
standard embraced by the majority IIplaces the burden on 
prosecutors to explain why those errors were harmless.1I83 Justice 
Stevens' dissension on the issue of burden of proof is important 
because it transforms the apparently IImajorityll statements into 
mere plurality statements. Stevens, after all, was one of the five 
Justices comprising the Brecht majority; his disagreement on the 
issue of burden of proof thus left only four Justices to support the 
proposition that the burden of proof should be placed upon the 
habeas petitioner. 
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity in 
Brecht regarding the burden of proof on habeas review. In O'Neal 
1). McAninch,84 a six-three decision, the Court acknowledged that 
Brecht left unresolved the issue of who bears the burden of proof.85 
Interestingly, however, the O'Neal Court explicitly stated that it 
did not believe that habeas review of constitutional error should be 
expressed in terms of a IIburden of proof. II 86 Rather, because habeas 
80. [d. at 637. 
81. The four dissenters were Justices White, Blackm.un, and Souter. [d. at 
644. Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissent. 
82. See id. at 647 (White, J., dissenting:). 
83. [d. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring:) (emphasis added). 
84.513 U.S. 432 (1995). 
85. See id. at 438-39. 
86. [d. at 436 ("As an initial matter, we note that we deliberately phrase the 
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review of constitutional trial error involves the application of a 
legal standard to a trial record, the Court concluded that it was 
"conceptually clearer for the [appellate] judge to ask directly, 'Do 
I, the judge, think that the error substantially influenced the jury's 
decision?' than for the [appellate] judge to try to put the same 
question in terms of proof burdens (e.g., 'Do I believe the party has 
borne its burden of showing .•. ?'). "87 
O'Neal thus makes it clear that, if an appellate judge is in "grave 
doubt" as to whether the error had a "substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," the judge 
must conclude that the error was harmful and grant habeas relief.88 
In this manner, O'Neal appears to establish a rule of thumb for 
close cases. If the appellate judge looks at the trial record and finds 
it "evenly balanced" such that he cannot defmitively determine if 
the error affected the verdict or not, O'Neal instructs the appellate 
judge to err on the side of the accused and grant the habeas 
petition.89 
O'Neal's rule-requiring that close cases be decided in favor of 
the habeas petitioner- thus effectively operates in the same way as 
if the burden of proof were placed upon the prosecutor. In other 
words, if the Court had chosen to explicitly place the burden of 
proof upon the prosecutor, a record in evidentiary equipoise would 
mean that the prosecutor had failed to carry his burden of proof, 
and the habeas petition would be granted. It is curious, therefore, 
why the Court appeared so adamant about avoiding the "burden of 
proof" label, when the pragmatic outcome of the O'Neal decision 
is the same as placing the burden on the prosecutor.90 The 
issue in this case in terms of a judge's grave doubt, instead of in terms of 'burden 
of proof .• "). 
87. Id at 436-37. 
88. See id. at 435-36. 
89. See id at 437 ("The case may sometimes arise, however, where the record 
is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the 
harmlessness of an error. This is the narrow circumstance we address here. n) 
(citation omitted). 
90. Accord Sinnott v. Duval, 139 F.3d 12, 15 (1st. eir. 1998). 
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avoidance of the "burden of proof" label has also proven difficult 
for lower courts, which appear to think instinctively in such terms. 
After O'Neal, it is not unusual for lower courts still to address 
habeas cases in terms of burdens of proof and-even more 
interestingly-to place the burden upon the habeas petitioner.91 
In the end, adopting the Kotteakos standard rather than the 
Chapman standard for harmless error on habeas review is, perhaps, 
more of a semantic than substantive difference. Either standard 
requires a large degree of judgment which is difficult, if not 
impossible, to express with precision. As Justice O'Connor pointed 
out in her dissent in Brecht, "Kotteakos, it is true, is somewhat more 
lenient; it will permit more errors to pass uncorrected. But that 
simply reduces the number-of cases in which relief will be granted. 
It does not decrease the burden of identifying those cases that 
warrant relief. ,,92 As Justice Stevens shrewdly noted in his 
concurrence in Brecht, "In the end, the way we phrase the 
governing standard is far less important than the quality of the 
judgment with which it is applied. "93 
VI. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR 
A. Civil Cases 
The harmless error standard for civil cases is found in Michigan 
Court Rule 2.613, which uses an "inconsistent with substantial 
91. See, e.g., Murr v. United States, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 123, at *33 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (nTo warrant habeas relief because of incorrect jury instructions, 
Petitioner must show that the instructions, as a whole, were so inftrm that they 
rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair. n); United States v. Chavez, 193 
F.3d 375,379 (5th Cir. 1999) (nUnder [the Brecht] standard, habeas petitioners 
may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not 
entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it 
resulted in actual prejudice. n); Dearth v. Hickman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5278, 
at *10 (N.D. Calif. 1999); Kouretas v. Prunty, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2881, at *5 
(N.D. Calif. 1998). 
92. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
93.Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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justice II standard.94 A recent decision of the ¥ichigan Supreme 
Court, Merrow v. Bofferding,95 illustrates the application and 
meaning of harmless error in civil litigation. In Merrow, the 
plaintiff, a tenant, sued his landlord after sustaining injuries when 
his arm went through a glass storm door at the residence.96 The 
plaintiff's legal theory was that the landlord was negligent in 
installing or retaining the glass storm door, which the landlord 
knew or should have known presented a hazard to residents and 
their guests.97 The plaintiff claimed that his injury was caused when 
the storm door, which had just been opened, began to close upon 
his infant daughter.98 In an effort to stop the door from hitting his 
daughter, the plaintiff stuck out his arm, shattering the plate glass, 
and causing extensive injury to the plaintiff.99 
The landlord's conjecture as to what caused the plaintiff's 
injuries was quite different. Specifically, at trial the landlord offered 
into evidence the hospital record of the plaintiff's injury, which 
stated that the plaintiff "was involved in a fight with his girlfriend 
and subsequently put his right arm through a plate glass 
window . .,100 This evidence, argued the landlord, indicated that the 
plaintiff's injury had not been caused by the landlord's negligence, 
but rather by the plaintiff's own intervening act. lOl 
The plaintiff in Merrow objected to the admission of the 
hospital record on grounds of hearsay.102 Specifically, the plaintiff 
argued that the document: (1) was not made for purposes of 
diagnosis or treatment as required under the medical records 
94. "An error ... is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a 
verdict, or for ... otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refUsal to 
take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. "MICH. 
CT. R. 2.613 (emphasis added). 
95. 581 N.W.2d 696 (Mich. 1998). 
96. See id. at 697. 
97. See id. at 698. 
98. See id. at 697. 
99. See id. at 697-98. 
100. [d. at 698 (emphasis omitted). 
101. See id. 
102. Seeid. 
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hearsay exception;103 and (2) was not "trustworthy" enough to 
qualify under the business records hearsay exception.104 The trial 
court admitted the hospital record under the hearsay exception for 
business records. lOS The jury then returned a special verdict in favor 
of the landlord, finding that the landlord was negligent but 
concluding that the landlord's "negligence was not the proximate 
cause of the plaintiffs injury. "106 
The plaintiff appealed the judgment, raising as a point of error 
the trial court's admission of the hospital record. A divided panel 
of the Michigan Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, 
reversed the judgment, concluding that the trial court had abused 
its discretion in admitting the hospital record under the business 
records hearsay exception.l07 The Michigan Supreme Court agreed 
to review the decision of the co'urt of appeals and, in a five-two 
decision, ruled in favor of the plaintiff. lOS The court concluded that 
the trial court had committed error by admitting the hospital 
record, which contained hearsay within hearsay,l09 the document 
itself being admissible as a business record,110 but the statement 
within the hospital record-to the effect that the plaintiff "had a 
fight with his girlfriend"-did not qualify for any hearsay 
exception. 111 
The trial court's error in admitting the hearsay hospital record 
was, moreover, harmful error, according to the Michigan Supreme 
COurt.112 The court concluded that the admission of the hospital 
record affected a "substantial right" of the plaintiff because the 
hospital record was the key piece of evidence supporting the 
landlord's theory that the plaintiffs injury was not accidental, but 
103. See id.; see also MICH. R. EVID. 803(4). 
104. See Merrow, 581 N.W.2d at 698; see also MICH. R. EVID. 803(6). 
105. SeeMerrow, 581 N.W.2d at 699. 
106.Id at 700 (emphasis added). 
107. Seeid. 
108. See id. 
109. Seeid. 
110. See id. 
111. See id at 701. 
112. See id. at 704. 
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deliberate.ll3 Without the hospital record, in other words, the 
landlord clearly could not have convinced the jury to fmd that the 
landlord's negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs 
injury. Moreover, the court pointed out that the special verdict 
form used by the jury clearly revealed the impact that the hospital 
record had on the jury.114 Since the jury's special verdict found the 
landlord negligent, but further found that the landlord's negligence 
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, the jury must have 
believed the statement contained in the hospital record that the 
plaintiff had been "involved in a fight with his girlfriend and 
subsequently put his right arm through a plate glass windOW."llS 
Given that there was virtually no other evidence to support the 
landlord's theory and the jury's conclusions as revealed by the 
special verdict form, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that 
the erroneous admission of the hospital record had affected a 
substantial right of the plaintiff by affecting the outcome of the 
jury's verdict. 116 
In an earlier decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, [lins v. 
Burns,117 two cars collided, resulting in a negligence suit between 
the drivers.us No ticket was issued to either driver; however, at 
trial, the defense counsel, on direct examination, asked his client 
whether she had received a ticket after the collision (to which she 
answeredno).119 The plaintiffs counsel objected to this question on 
relevancy grounds and requested a mistrial, which the trial judge 
denied.l20 A police officer then took the stand, and defense counsel 
asked the officer if a ticket was issued after the collision.l2l Before 
the officer had a chance to answer the question, plaintiffs counsel 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. Id at 698 (emphasis added). 
116. See id at 704. 
117. 201 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 1972). 
118. See iti. at 625. 
119. See id at 625·26. 
120. See id. at 626. 
121. See id at 626-27. 
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again objected to such questioning.l22 The trial judge sustained the 
plaintiff's objection and instructed the jury "not to consider in your 
deliberations whether any traffic tickets were or were not issued to 
either driver. "123 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendant124 and plaintiff appealed, citing as error the trial judge's 
failure to grant a mistrial based upon the defense counsel's 
prejudicial questions relating to whether a ticket was issued.12S 
The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff that 
defense counsel's questions had a "prejudicial effect," but 
nonetheless concluded that the trial judge's failure to grant the 
mistrial motion was harmless error.126 Specifically, the court 
concluded that the trial judge's instruction to disregard the 
questions provided an adequate cure for the error.l27 
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, in favor of the plaintiff, 
stating that "[0 ]nce prejudicial error is found, the cases call for 
reversal regardless of whether the trial judge gave an instruction in an 
attempt to cure the error. "128 The court further clarified that there are 
three relevant factors to consider in determining whether a trial 
error is "prejudicial" (i.e., harmful): 
(1) "the excessiveness or unfairness of the verdict;" 
(2) the "intent of counsel in introducing [the] evidence;" and 
(3) "whether the evidence went to the substantive issues of the 
case. "129 
Thus, the court concluded that if the erroneously admitted 
testimony is inadvertent, the error is not repeated, and proper 
curative instructions are provided, the court "would uphold the 
122. Seeid. 
123.Id. at 627. 
124. Seeid. 
125. Seeid. 
126. Seeid. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
129.Id. 
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assessment of a trial judge that the error, though potentially 
prejudicial, was harmless. "130 
Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, the Michigan 
Supreme Coun held that the tnal error was harmful because 
defense counsel's questioning was "deliberate and not an incident 
that inadvenently occurred" 131 and the offensive line of questioning 
was repeated, thereby increasing the likelihood that an instruction 
would not cure the prejudicial effect upon the jury .132 Thus, in the 
context of civil litigation, Jlins instructs that the provision of jury 
instructions to disregard erroneously admitted evidence will often, 
but not always, cure error.133 However, if the error is deliberate 
and! or repeated, the chances substantially increase that the error is 
reversible (i.e., harmful), even if a curative instruction is provided. 
B. Criminal Cases 
In Michigan, a special statute exists to define harmless error in 
criminal cases: uNo judgment or verdict shall be set aside . . . 
unless . . . after an examination of the entire cause, it shall 
affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a 
miscarriage afjustice. 11134 The criminal harmless error statute is thus 
differentiated from its civil counterpart135 by the addition of the 
mandate that the error complained of "affirmatively appearll to 
result in a miscarriage of justice. This phrase, as will be discussed 
more extensively below, has been interpreted by the Michigan 
Supreme Conn to have significant meaning. Moreover, the criminal 
130.Id. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. 
133. J ustice Jackson once said that the idea that curative instructions can cure 
otherwise prejudicial error is a "naive assumption" that "all practicing lawyers 
know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 
(1949) aackson, J., concurring). 
134. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 769.26 (1979) (emphasis added). 
135. nAn error ... is not ground for ... setting aside a verdict ... unless 
refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice." MICH. CT. R. 2.613. 
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and civil standards differ in their characterization of the degree of 
injustice required for the appellate court to set aside the judgment 
below. Specifically, the civil harmless error statute requires that the 
judgment below be "inconsistent with substantial justice" before the 
appellate court may characterize the error as harmful,136 whereas 
the criminal harmless error statute states that the appellate court 
must find a "miscarriage of justice" before it may characterize the 
error as harmful.137 
The question thus arises as to whether there is any substantive 
distinction to be drawn between an error that is "inconsistent with 
substantial justice" and one which causes a "miscarriage of justice." 
At first glance, the civil standard ("inconsistent with substantial 
justice 11) appears more conservative than the criminal standard 
("miscarriage of justice") because the civil standard would permit 
appellate reversal only for those errors inconsistent with a concept 
of "substantial" justice, implying that "complete" justice is not 
required. In other words, if an error in a civil trial can be grounds 
for appellate reversal only upon a showing that" substantial" justice 
has not been achieved, does this imply that something less than 
complete justice is acceptable? In the criminal harmless error 
statute, by contrast, any error which results in a "miscarriage of 
justice" is grounds for appellate reversal, suggesting that 
IIjustice"-not just "substantial" justice-is the hallmark in the 
criminal context. This difference between "justice 11 and "substantial 
justice" is not merely semantics. Indeed, it intuitively makes sense 
for the criminal harmless error standard to be more liberal than its 
civil analogue. After all, more is at stake in a criminal trial than a 
civil trial; one's liberty or even life is on the line. Thus, a harmless 
error standard predicated on a "miscarriage of justice"-of any 
degree-indicates that society is unwilling to tolerate as many errors 
in a criminal trial as it would in a civil trial.13S 
136. Seeid. 
137. See MICH. COMPo LAWS § 769.26 (1979). 
138. We recognize, of course, that some may argue that the use of the word 
"miscarriage" in the criminal harmless error standard suggests that not all errors 
of justice warrant reversal, and thus that the criminal harmless error standard 
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1. People v. Lukity 
Most errors in criminal trials, of course, do not result in a 
violation of the accused's constitutional rights. In Michigan, the 
harmless error standard for such non-constitutional errors has 
undergone great change in recent months. Most significantly, in 
July 1999, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Lukity.139 
This five-two decision, penned by Justice Taylor, notably overruled 
a 1998 decision by the court in People v. Gearns.140 
In Lukity, the jury convicted the defendant of first degree 
criminal sexual conduct against his fourteen year-old daughter.141 
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed Lukity's conviction, 
reasoning that the cumulative effect of three separate trial errors 
denied Lukity the right to a fair trial.142 One of the three trial 
errors, according to the Michigan Court of Appeals, was the 
admission of evidence bolstering the daughter's character for 
truthfulness before the defendant had attacked her veracity .143 
Specifically, the prosecutor at trial was allowed to introduce 
evidence from the daughter'S teacher, mother, brother, and the 
investigating police officer regarding her good character for 
veracity, despite the fact that her veracity had not been attacked by 
the defendant.144 
The Michigan Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred 
implicitly incorporates a "substantial" justice standard analogous to the civil 
harmless error standard. We disagree with this argument, however, since the 
phrase "miscarriage of justice" appears more likely intended to be synonymous 
with "harmful to justice, " suggesting more of a descriptive than substantive 
standard. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 728 (1981) (defining 
"miscarriage" as "a failure in the administration of justice. h). 
139.596 N.W.2d 607 (Mich. 1999). 
140. 577 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 1998), overruled by People v. Lukity, 596 
N.W.2d 607 (1999). 
141. See Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 609. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 610. 
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in allowing such bolstering evidence to be admitted.14s Once such 
error had been found, the court immediately turned its attention to 
the criminal harmless error statute.146 The court quickly confessed 
that the statute does not address the "level of assurance" that an 
appellate court must have that the error did not result in a 
"miscarriage of justice. "147 The court acknowledged that, one year 
earlier, a majority in People v. Gearns,148 had, in fact, agreed upon 
a "level of assurance" test.149 Specifically, in Gearns the court 
concluded that, for non-constitutional error, the burden is on the 
prosecutor to convince the appellate court that it is "highly 
probable" that the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect the 
verdict. ISO 
Gearns thus created a presumption that a non-constitutional 
error is harmful (Le., requires reversal) unless the prosecutor 
demonstrates that it is "highly probable" that the error was, in fact, 
harmless.ls1 The Lukity majority explicitly overruled Gearns, 
substituting in its place two rather remarkable new rules. First (and 
most importantly), Lukity shifted the burden of persuasion from 
the prosecution to the criminal defendant.152 Second, Lukity 
substituted the "highly probable" standard for anew, less rigorous 
"more probable than not "standard of proof.153 
The burden shift of Lukity-from prosecutor onto the criminal 
defendant-was necessitated, according to the Michigan Supreme 
Court, by the language of the Michigan criminal harmless error 
statute.154 Specifically, the court stated that placing the burden upon 
the prosecutor, as had been done in Gearns, was inconsistent with 
the language of section 26 because "Section 26 states that the types 
145. See id. at 610-11. 
146. See ide at 611. 
147. See ide at 611-12. 
148. 577 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 1998). 
149. See Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 611-12. 
150. See ide at 611; see also Geams. 577 N.W.2d at 438. 
151. See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 437-38. 
152. See Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 611-13. 
153. See ide at 612-13. 
154. See ide at 611-12. 
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of errors listed are not grounds for reversal unless it shall 
'affirmatively appear' that such error resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice." 155 Thus, the use of the phrase "affrrmatively appear" in the 
Michigan criminal harmless error statute was interpreted by the 
court as imposing a presumption that errors in criminal trials are 
harmless. It is only if the criminal defendant introduces evidence by 
which it lIaffrrmatively appears ll that the error resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice that errors in criminal trials may be deemed 
harmful. The phrase "affirmatively appear," thus interpreted, was 
intended by the Michigan legislature to shift the burden of proof 
onto the criminal defendant. 
This conclusion by the court was certainly not without 
controversy, even among the Justices themselves. Justice Brickley 
reluctantly concurred with the majority's conclusion as to the 
burden of proof, concluding that "as a matter of policy [the 'highly 
probable' standard of Gearns] is appropriate, [however,] I am 
unable to reconcile the Gearns test with Michigan's harmless error 
statute. The statute states that the verdict should not be disturbed 
unless 'it shall affirmatively appear' that the error was prejudicial. 
The majority's standard is more consistent with this language than 
the standard we set forth in Gearns. "156 
Two dissenters in Lukity, Justices Cavanagh and Kelly, took 
issue with the majority's interpretation of the phrase" affirmatively 
appear": 
In the words 'affirmatively appear' ... the majority finds 
lurking a rebuttable presumption of harmlessness. While the 
word 'affirmatively' ... must be surely be given meaning, 
[we] cannot fathom any definition of the word that includes 
a meaning such as 'in sufficient fashion as to defeat a 
rebuttable presumption of harmlessness.' And yet, that is 
how the majority 'reads' the statute .... 157 
155.Id. 
156.Id. at 617 (Brickley, J., concurring). 
157.Id. at 618 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
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The dissenters thus believed the phrase was not intended by the 
Michigan Legislature to shift the burden of proof from the 
prosecution to the criminal defendant. Instead, they believed that 
"[a] more literal and simpler definition of affirmatively, which, in 
its various forms, implies an assertion that something is true, might 
well speak more to a court having some level of assurance than it 
does to any rebuttable presumption. While claiming (correctly) 
that § 26 'controls' our inquiry, the majority must, in effect, add a 
considerable amount of text to the statute in order for it to 
'control' its chosen result. "158 The dissenters therefore interpret the 
phrase "affirmatively appear" to denote a "level of assurance" rather 
than an indication of who bears the burden of proof. In other 
words, the phrase "affirmatively appear" was intended by the 
legislature to indicate that an appellate court reviewing a claim of 
harmful error in a criminal trial must have a relatively high level of 
assurance that the claimed error was, in fact, harmful, before it 
would be appropriate to overturn the defendant's conviction. The 
claimed error thus must "affirmatively" appear to the appellate 
court to be harmful before setting aside the conviction. Thus 
viewed, the phrase does not necessarily implicate the separate 
question regarding who-prosecutor or criminal defendant-bears 
the burden of convincing the appellate court that the error 
affirmatively appears. 
The Lukity dissenters also took issue with the pragmatic 
implications of the majority's decision to shift the burden of proof 
upon the criminal defendant: 
Exactly how, I would ask, will this presumption ever be 
rebutted? . . . [T]he appellate court (particularly if it 
sanctions inference piling) will always be in a position to 
state 'a reasonable jury could have found' and rely on 
whatever untainted testimony ... exists in the record. The 
majority has constructed a hurdle that cannot be cleared, 
not because of its height, but because of the wall on the 
lSS.Id. 
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other side. 159 
By shifting the burden upon the criminal defendant to prove that 
the trial error was harmful, the Lukity majority requires that the 
criminal defendant convince the appellate court that, but for the 
trial error, the defendant would have been acquitted. H there is 
other, untainted evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt upon 
which a reasonable jury could rely, the appellate court is, under 
Lukity, instructed to affirm the conviction. 
The emphasis of Lukity is thus on getting the" right result" and 
disregarding all errors in criminal trials that are not proven by the 
defendant to have resulted in a wrongful conviction. On the one 
hand, such a standard makes instinctive sense, both from a 
philosophical and economic standpoint. Philosophically, Lukity 
ensures that criminal convictions are not set aside by appellate 
courts unless the appellate court is convinced-by the 
defendant-that the trial error resulted in a conviction that would 
not otherwise have occurred. In this way, appellate courts are 
instructed by Lukity to affirm the vast majority of convictions so 
long as there is a sufficient quantum of untainted evidence upon 
which to base the defendant's conviction. Viewed this way, the 
conviction is "right" based upon the evidence, so why should we, 
societally, reverse it? Moreover, by placing, the burden of proof 
upon the criminal defendant, Lukity serves as a deterrent to appeals 
of criminal convictions. Thus, from an economic standpoint, there 
are likely to be fewer appeals of criminal convictions clogging the 
already crowded dockets of Michigan courts and taxpayers will not 
have to fund as many retrials that are likely to result in the same 
verdict.l60 It is evident, therefore, that Lukity is far removed from 
159.Id. at 619 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
160. Of course, one could argue that, by making reversal of criminal 
convictions more difficult, Lukity may be viewed as economically inefficient due 
to the resulting increase in the prison population. Whether this is true or not is 
unclear, since the size of the prison population is dependent upon numerous 
other factors not affected by Lukity, including availability of parole, sentencing 
decisions, and culture. 
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the common law conception of the "appearance of justice." Justice, 
as it appears today, is a broader, more attainable concept. Technical 
errors in a criminal trial no longer automatically taint the 
appearance of justice. Justice is achieved, in short, if the jury 
reached the "right result" (i.e., in accordance with the evidence), 
even if there were one or more errors committed by the trial court. 
The Lukity decision is also notable because of its holding 
regarding the standard-or level of proof-that it establishes. In 
other words, not only did Lukity decide that the burden of proof 
should fall upon the criminal defendant, but it also tells us what 
quantum of evidence the criminal defendant must introduce in 
order to convince the appellate court that the alleged error was 
harmful. Specifically, Lukity requires the criminal defendant to 
prove that it is "more probable than not" that the error affected the 
trial verdict.161 According to the majority, this standard was also 
necessitated by the language of the criminal harmless error 
statute.162 Specifically, the majority concluded that because 
"[s]ection 26 places the burden on a defendant to demonstrate a 
miscarriage of justice, any higher standard, e.g., 'highly probable,' 
would place a greater burden on defendants than Section 26 
envisions. "163 
This reference to the "highly probable" standard is clearly 
intended to address the court's previous holding in Gearns, which 
had ruled that the prosecution bore the burden of proving that it 
was "highly probable" that an alleged error was harmless.l64 Once 
the Lukity majority concluded that the criminal harmless error 
statute mandated that the burden of proof be placed upon the 
criminal defendant (i.e., that the burden of proof allocation of 
Gearns be overruled), it appeared hesitant to impose a quantum of 
proof standard higher than "more probable than not." Gearns, in 
other words, was wrong on both counts: its interpretation of the 
criminal harmless error statute as placing the burden of proof upon 
161. See Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 613. 
162. See id. at 611-12. 
163. Id. at 612. 
164. See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d 422, 438 (Mich. 1998). 
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the prosecution was wrong, as was its interpretation of the statute 
relating to the quantum of evidence required to be adduced. The 
court's 1998 decision in Gearns, of course, purported to be an 
interpretation of the same criminal harmless error statute that was 
being interpreted in Lukity. Yet the court-one short year 
later-reached a completely different interpretation. In dissent, 
Justices Cavanagh and Kelly took issue with the majority's about-
face: II Gearns and its companion were not easy cases, and there 
certainly was no lack of deliberation or debate among the Court. 
Now, but a year later, we are summarily told that Gearns was 
wrongly decided .... "165 The vitriolic dissenters also appeared to 
question the motives of the Justices in the majority, stating that 
Justice Taylor and the Chief Justice, upon finding that there 
is now a majority .. 0 to join them, are ... free to cast their 
formerly rejected view as our new rule. Such endeavors, 
however, are likely to suggest that the decisions of this 
Court are only as stable as its composition, and that changes 
in it might be presumed by some to evidence a mandate for 
wholesale changes in the other, even in the absence of the 
passage of time, changes in circumstances, or any other of 
the more noble reasons to reevaluate our past decisions.166 
Whether one agrees with the holding of Lukity or not, the 
court's sudden reinterpretation of the language of the criminal 
harmless error statute is baffling. The language of the statute did 
not change in the intervening year between Gearns and Lukity. 
Indeed, as Justices Cavanagh and Kelly point out in their dissent, 
the only thing that did appear to change in the intervening year was 
the composition of the Michigan Supreme Court. And while it is 
certainly true that each jurist brings to the court his or her own 
views, it is equally true that the rule of stare decisis is supposed to 
temper fluctuations in the law predicated on the individual ideology 
165. Lukity, 596 N.W.2d at 617 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
166.Id at 617 n.1 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
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of members of the bench. Given that Justices of the Michigan 
Supreme Court are elected, perhaps the reverence generally given 
to stare decisis is naive. 
2. People v. Graves 
One additional recent Michigan Supreme Court case is worth 
noting regarding non-constitutional error in a criminal trial. In 
People v. Graves,167 the defendant was charged with first degree 
murder. II At the close of the prosecution's case, defense counsel 
moved for a directed verdict of acquittal regarding the first-degree 
murder charge. The trial court denied the motion and instructed 
the jury that it could fmd [Graves] guilty of first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter,1I168 or that it 
could find Graves not guilty.169 The jury found Graves guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter, and Graves appealed the conviction, 
arguing that the trial court II erred in submitting the first degree 
murder charge to the jury."170 Specifically, Graves argued that the 
first degree murder charge submission was unwarrranted by the 
proof because there was no evidence of premeditation and 
deliberation.l71 
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed Graves' conviction, 
holding that the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People 
v. Vail,l72 required automatic reversal.l73 Vail held that 
where a jury is permitted consideration of a charge 
unwarranted by the proofs there is always prejudice because 
a defendant's chances of acquittal on any valid charge is 
substantially decreased by the possibility of a compromise 
167. 581 N.W.2d 229 (Mich. 1998). 
168.Id. at 231. 
169. Seeid. 
170.Id. 
171. Seeid. 
172. 227 N.W.2d 535 (Mich. 1975). 
173. See Graves, 581 N.W.2d at 231. 
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verdict. For this reason it is reversible error for a trial judge 
to refuse a directed verdict of acquittal on any charge where 
the prosecution has failed to present evidence from which 
the jury could find all elements of the crime charged.174 
Vail thus set forth a rule of automatic reversal for a specific type of 
preserved, non-constitutional error (submission of a charge 
unwarranted by the proof). And while the Michigan Court of 
Appeals in Graves reversed the defendant's conviction based upon 
the automatic reversal rule of Vail, they did so reluctantly. Indeed, 
two of the court of appeals judges urged the Michigan Supreme 
Court to overrule Vail.175 
Not surprisingly, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed to review 
the decision of the court of appeals in Graves. In a close, four-to-
three decision, the supreme court accepted the invitation of the 
court of appeals to overrule Vail, concluding that "the automatic 
reversal rule of Vail is inconsistent with this Court's modem 
harmless-error jurisprudence. "176 The court specifically found that 
Vail was inconsistent with the language of the Michigan criminal 
harmless error statute which, by its terms, does not appear to 
require automatic reversal for any criminal trial errors.177 The court 
further reasoned that criminal defendants have "no room to 
complain" if a charge is improperly submitted to the jury, so long 
as the defendant is acquitted of the improperly submitted charge 
and the basis of the defendant's conviction is a "charge that was 
properly submitted to the jury. "178 Requiring automatic reversal in 
such situations-as Vail required-is disrespectful of juries because 
automatic reversal is premised on speculation that jurors 
compromise their views in violation oftheir instructions.179 Finally, 
the Graves court noted tha,t the automatic reversal rule of Vail 
174. Vail, 227 N.W.2d at 536. 
175. See People v. Graves, 569 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
176. Graves, 581 N.W.2d at 232. 
177. See id. at 233. 
178.Id. 
179. See id. at 234. 
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results in an inefficient use of scarce judicial resources "by 
automatically reversing an otherwise valid conviction. II 180 
The three dissenters in Graves-Justices Cavanagh, Mallett, and 
Kelly-defended the automatic reversal rule of Vail on the grounds 
that it was consistent with the "highly probable" standard for non-
constitutional error pronounced in Gearns. 181 The majority, of 
course, disagreed, perhaps intimating the court's forthcoming 
reversal of Gearns in the Lukity decision. 
What is to be learned from Graves beyond perhaps that it 
foretold the outcome in Lukity? There are likely two alternative 
ways of viewing the holding in Graves. The narrow holding of 
Graves is that submission to a criminal jury of a charge not 
warranted by the proof is not grounds for automatic reversal (i.e., 
it is not per se harmful error). A broader view of the holding in 
Graves-and one that is more consistent with the court's decision 
in Lukity-is that, because of the language of the criminal harmless 
error statute, non-constitutional errors can never result in 
automatic reversal. Indeed, after the court's decision in Lukity, it is 
reasonable to presume that all appeals based upon non-
constitutional errors will require that the criminal defendant 
convince the appellate court that the error "more probably than 
not" affected the outcome of the trial. 
VIT. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to answer the deceptively simple 
question, "What is 'harmless' error in Michigan?" As we hope we 
have demonstrated, answering this question is a complex task that 
requires the consideration of numerous factors, including: (1) Was 
the alleged error preserved or unpreserved at the trial level? (2) Did 
the alleged error involve a violation of the party's constitutional 
rights? (3) If the alleged error involved a violation of constitutional 
rights, is the constitutional error structural or non-structural in 
i80.Id. 
181.Id at 236 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
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nature? (4) If the alleged error involved a violation of constitutional 
rights, is the point of error being raised on direct or habeas corpus 
review? (5) If the alleged error did not involve a violation of 
constitutional rights, did the error occur in a civil or criminal trial? 
How one answers these basic questions will provide a basic 
indication of the test, or standard, for harmless error that a court 
would apply, as well as an indication as to who would bear the 
burden of proving that the error is harmful (or harmless). 
On a deeper level, the "standard" adopted for harmless error, 
and the allocation of the burden of proving it, reveals a policy 
judgment about the level of assurance that an appellate court 
requires before it will reverse a judgment. Thus, courts reserve the 
highest standard-automatic reversal-for structural constitutional 
errors raised on direct review-a type of trial error courts deem to 
be the most serious and likely to be prejudicial. Somewhat lower 
standards (e.g., the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for non-
structural constitutional errors raised on direct review) likewise 
reveal a need to have a very high level of assurance in the 
correctness of the verdict before a court will affirm a conviction on 
appeal. Still lower standards (e.g., "more probable than not" 
standard for non-constitutional errors on direct review or the 
Kotteakos standard for habeas review requiring affIrmance unless 
the defendant can show a "substantial and injurious effect") reveal 
a lesser need for assurance in the correctness of the verdict before 
a court will affIrm it on appeal. Moreover, to whom we allocate the 
burden of proof is clearly a policy decision reflecting what the 
outcome of an appeal should be in a close case. Thus, for example, 
by shifting the burden onto the criminal defendant in Lukity, the 
court expressed its belief that the Michigan Legislature wanted 
appellate courts to affirm rather than reverse criminal convictions 
in a close case. 
In the end, a simple, uniform definition of harmless error 
proves elusive in Michigan as elsewhere. But if one understands the 
purpose of harmless error, one begins to see that the bewildering 
array of standards reflect a common idea: that courts should 
customize the definition of harmless error to reflect the degree of 
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seriousness to which society ascribes particular types of trial error 
and our varying notions of IIjusticell in particular types of cases. 
Viewed this way, harmless error in Michigan is still a riddle, but a 
riddle with an answer to which one can make an educated guess. 
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